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Health care policymaking, particularly as it relates to technology and innovation, is 
extraordinarily complex and often fraught with unforeseen consequences. This thesis 
explores the intricate political history and economic underpinnings of the American 
health care system, which have created the most expensive, and many would argue—
most inefficient—system in the world. More specifically, it examines the impact of 
technology and innovation on the evolution of that system. The Policy Follows approach 
to health care policymaking introduced in this thesis, provides a clear and forward-
thinking approach to integrating research, evidence, and expertise into the creation of 
informed and impactful health policy. Recent, relevant case studies illustrate the pitfalls 
of aggressive or poorly-informed health care technology policies advanced by political 
or industry agendas without the guidance of adequate scientific support. I examine the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health technology landscape, with particular 
attention to the precipitous expansion of telehealth and virtual care services as a means 
of addressing the associated challenges, and discuss the imminent policy and 
regulatory questions facing the health care system as it emerges from this 
unprecedented national state of emergency. Prior to the pandemic, the growth and 
adoption of telehealth across the country was greatly inhibited by a several key barriers, 
particularly state-by-state variation in policies, the conflicting incentives of a fee-for-
service based system, and an overall lack of rigorous research to guide development.  
The Policy Follows approach elucidates the path forward, guided by research and 




post-pandemic transformation of health care in the U.S. into a more equitable, efficient, 
cost-effective, and integrated system.   
Primary Reader: Marilyn Serafini 
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President Donald Trump once infamously stated that health care “is an unbelievably 
complex subject. Nobody knew health care could be so complicated.” In truth all 
policymaking is difficult, particularly in the United States, where lawmaking is subject to 
the unique and complex intricacies of our system of checks and balances. Since health 
care’s inclusion as an important policy issue in our political platforms, it has also been 
subject, like most policy agendas, to the prevailing political whims and social sentiments 
of the day. However, what separates health care from other policy planks is that its 
subjugation to such whims and sentiments holds actual—and occasionally immediate—
life and death consequences for our citizens.  
These consequences have become even more pronounced in an era marked by 
increasing globalization, political polarization, and the most rapid evolution of innovation 
the world has yet seen. And it has not escaped anyone’s attention that, while the US 
spends more money on health care than any other nation in the world, we often do not 
get what we pay for. In 2018 a joint study between Harvard’s TH Chan’s School of 
Public Health and The London School of Economics, published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, confirmed this, “in 2016, the U.S. spent 17.8 percent of 
its gross domestic product on health care, while other countries ranged from 9.6 percent 
(Australia) to 12.4 percent (Switzerland). Life expectancy in the U.S. was the lowest of 
all 11 countries in the study, at 78.8 years; the range for other countries was 80.7 to 
83.9 years.”1 This is particularly true given that the US is also a world leader in health 
 




care technologies. Should innovation not improve outcomes and lessen the expense of 
care? It should. The perennial debate is over why it has not.  
This thesis establishes a clear and forward-thinking approach to the development of 
health care policy, specifically as it relates to new technologies, an approach I term 
policy follows. I provide the historical context of health policymaking, the economic and 
political underpinnings of today’s health care system, and case studies of failed policy 
implementation, to illustrate the importance of the policy follows methodology. Finally, I  
use the pandemic as a laboratory for examining the strengths and weaknesses of our 
policymaking decisions to date and provide recommendations for how the policy follows 
method might best be utilized to assist in the development of a new, post-pandemic 




CHAPTER 1 – Why is the Provision and Policymaking 
of Health Care so Difficult? 
INTRODUCTION 
“There is nothing more fraught than health care, because it is so personal and it is so 
intimate, and every political party that decides to take on health care in some massive, 
poorly-understood way reaps both the backlash and political retaliation.”   
- Charlie Sykes, conservative political commentator, on PBS Frontline, 
“America’s Great Divide: From Obama to Trump.” 
Health care is complicated. This is rarely more evident than in the field of health care 
policymaking. Indeed, both the Executive branch and Congress have labored over 
passing comprehensive health care reforms since the rise of progressivism and the 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt.2 Republican and Democrat lawmakers alike have 
tried and failed. In fact, the United States does not currently crack the top ten of the 
nations with the best access to health care in recent surveys.3 A 2019 World Health 
Organization special study ranked the US as 37th in the world for nations with the best 
health care systems.4 This chapter delineates the historical context of the current U.S. 
health care system, explicates how the introduction and rapid pace of accelerated 
 
2 L. Manchikanti, S Li Helm, RM Benyamin, JA Hirsch. 2017. "Evolution of US Health Care Reform." Pain Physician 3 
(20): 107-110. 
3 B. Sawyer, D. McDermott. 2019. "How does the quality of the US healthcare system compare to other countries?" 
Peterson Kaiser Health System Tracker. March 28. Accessed May 2019. https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-
collection/quality-u-s-healthcare-system-compare-countries/#item-percent-used-emergency-department-for-condition-
that-could-have-been-treated-by-a-regular-doctor-2016. 




health information technology (HIT) has complicated the process of policymaking, and 
introduces the two arguments most often employed by those who seek to set and inform 
the agenda for HIT policy, the philosophies of policy leads and  policy follows. My thesis 
is that the policy follows approach is the sounder methodology for creating efficacious 
policies designed to support a health care system that can respond effectively to the 
rapid and often tumultuous advancements in health care technology.  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The Rise of Hospitals as the Center of the Health Care Ecosystem: An Early 
Example of the Policy Follows Approach Driven by Health Care Technology 
Hospitals exist as we know them today largely due to the evolution of technology in 
health care, and this history underpins much of our current debate around health care 
policy. The earliest practice of hospital care—or the closest approximation thereof—was 
the medical care provided in almshouses or institutions dedicated to housing and caring 
for the homeless and indigent, in the mid 1700s.5 The first facility in the colonies to 
focus primarily on treating medical conditions, the Pennsylvania Hospital, was founded 
by Benjamin Franklin in 1751. These early hospitals served mainly the poor and were 
funded almost entirely by individual donations and philanthropic organizations. The 
middle class and affluent generally received medical care at home, and paid set, and 
relatively modest, fees for care directly to the physician.6 Public hospitals in the U.S. 
 
5 Wall, Barbara Mann. “History of Hospitals”. University of Pennsylvania Nursing.  






began to proliferate between 1860 and 1930, a rise that can be directly tied to the 
precipitous increases in technological innovation during the Industrial Revolution, as 
these facilities allowed for the provision of more advanced care than could reasonably 
be administered at home. 7 Providing one of the earliest examples for the success of the 
policy follows approach, scientific advancements, improvements in medical education 
and licensure standards, alongside new guidelines for hospital organizational structures 
and management between 1900 and 1920, led to significant increases in physician 
status and income and an increasing acknowledgement of hospitals as credible sites of 
care across all socio-economic strata.  
 
The Almost Rise of National Health Insurance in the U.S.: When Policy Doesn’t 
Follow Evidence and the Experts 
Not coincidentally, the early 1900s also marks the beginning of the contentious debate 
surrounding the U.S. health care system. While this period would see the emergence of 
some form of national health insurance systems, or social insurance, in numerous 
European nations—most notably Germany in 1883—the U.S. did not follow suit.  
The political motivations for the early European movement toward providing social 
insurance are important to consider. They were not meant to address a perceived 
fundamental right to health care and were not backed by socialist or labor parties. 
Instead, these programs, supported by conservative government, were intended to 
 




stabilize incomes by decreasing the economic risk of lost earnings due to illness or 
injury, which were becoming increasingly ubiquitous during the industrial age. European 
programs did not initially cover the entirety of the population and were leveraged to gain 
political allegiance from the working class.8  Yet, despite the European movement, by 
1908 physicians and hospitals in the U.S. remained largely unregulated, and health 
policies were not offered by insurance companies. 
The unsuccessful U.S. campaign for social insurance was spearheaded by the Socialist 
Party in the early 1900s and was added as a plank in the Progressive Party’s platform 
when Theodore Roosevelt introduced the party before the 1912 presidential election. 
The strongest organizational advocate for nationalized social insurance was the 
American Association of Labor Legislation (AALL), founded in 1906, which consisted 
loosely of a coalition of academics and experts, “actuaries, lawyers, social scientists, 
and economists”9—the very experts this thesis maintains should have a strong voice in 
policy development. The AALL was primarily devoted to writing and promoting 
legislation defending fair workmen’s compensation and demanding employers’ 
coverage of medical care for industrial work accidents and related diseases. In 1912, 
while the federal debate begun under Roosevelt’s term continued, the AALL drafted 
state-focused legislation similar to the United Kingdom’s National Health Insurance law, 
passed the year before. In 1915, they again drafted state-focused legislation, this time 
mirroring Germany’s income-based approach to coverage. But the attempts to introduce 
 
8 Van Langendonck, Jozef. “The European Experience in Social Health Insurance.” Social Security Administration, 
Social Security Bulletin. 1973.  





such bills at the state level failed in the face of stalwart opposition by numerous 
influential groups with wide-ranging interests, including the American Medical 
Association, large insurance companies, the Christian Science Organization, the vast 
majority of employers, and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the largest union 
group in the U.S. for the first part of the 20th Century. Further, in stark contrast to 
Europe, a strong working-class voice for national social insurance was largely absent.10 
The 1920s saw an increase in hospital use and costs as the number of middle-class 
workers who sought care outside of the home began to rise. In 1929, the first pre-paid 
service plan for a group of employees to receive a predetermined amount of care with a 
local hospital, and similar plans with larger groups of hospitals, became increasingly 
popular during the height of the Great Depression. These arrangements, which 
expanded rapidly, were soon consolidated becoming known as the Blue Cross network 
and were heralded as a symbiotic relationship allowing workers to receive care at a 
decreased cost while assuring the financial viability of floundering hospitals.  
In 1926, the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care (CCMC) was convened by eight of 
the largest philanthropic funders of hospitals, to study the growing public need for health 
care. The committee, like the AALL, consisted of experts representing the fields of 
economics, medicine, and public health, and included representatives from the most 
powerful interest groups of the period. The CCMC was prolific, turning out scientific 
research resulting in twenty-six volumes and a few, more specific, reports over the span 
 






of five years. Their research findings revealed a significant increase in health care 
consumption, identified new and emerging trends in types of health provision, 
suggested the need for preventative care through community-based or public health 
centers, and called for an increase in national spending to cover the growing needs of 
the country—particularly those without any access to care. The committee also 
recommended a national health insurance program. Though they did not specify 
whether this program should be voluntary or compulsory, they did stipulate that funding 
should be provided through taxation. This evidence-based focus on preventative, 
population-based health care services over the more specialized and reactive, fee-for-
service model foreshadowed the future development of, and intense debate over value-
based care models in the U.S., and is a pivotal moment in what will become the U.S. 
trend toward a policy leads approach in health care, so often associated with big 
business and powerful special interest groups.  
The CCMC’s efforts quickly drew the ire of the AMA, which in 1933, published an 
editorial in their academic journal characterizing the report as “an incitement to 
revolution, socialist, and communist” 11 The AMA staunchly opposed any additional 
government spending or involvement in health care, primarily based not on scientific 
evidence, but on concerns that the growing number of health plan agreements would 
limit physician income, which was based on a fee-for-service model. This focus on the 
preservation of fee-for-service payments to physicians led to the establishment of a 
 
11 Gore, Thomas. “A forgotten landmark medical study from 1932 by the Committee on Cost of Medical Care.”  Baylor 




physician-backed network of plans designed to cover their own primary care services, 
later to become known as Blue Shield.12 
President Franklin Roosevelt, already well underway with the “first hundred days” of his 
social programs known collectively as the New Deal, was too busy attempting to pull the 
nation out of the depths of the Great Depression to pay heed to the debate over social 
insurance. However, by 1934 FDR had appointed an Economic Security Committee 
(ESC) and had already begun considering serious measures to overhaul federal safety 
net programs for workers, including social security and proposals on national health 
insurance models. Debates from within the ESC medical advisory committee were 
heated, as some physicians backed the AMA’s oppositional position while others 
warned that history would condemn the medical community for not supporting inclusion 
of health insurance in the social security legislation. In 1935, the Social Security Act was 
passed without inclusion of a health insurance plan. While this was a politically well-
calculated move, the failure to enact early evidence-based policy set into motion an 
accumulation of government responses that would eventually lead to the development 
of the world’s most expensive, complicated, and unequitable health care system. 
 
 








Employer-Based Health Insurance Coverage: A Uniquely American, and 
Problematic, Early Example of Policy Leads 
In 1941, the U.S. entered World War II and with many of its citizens deployed overseas, 
the nation faced a labor shortage. In 1942, concerns over rampant inflation led to 
passage of the Stabilization Act, which froze wages by barring employers from raising 
pay to compete for workers. To counter, businesses began offering health care 
“benefits,” like the service plans that led to the creation of the Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield plans in the previous decade. In 1943, the Internal Revenue Service authorized 
tax exemption status for employer-based health insurance. 13 This, in combination with 
the rise of hospital and physician-focused insurance programs, began what has become 
the problematic link between the health care system and employer-based health 
insurance. 
 Over the next several decades hospital-based care increasingly became the focus for 
private and public payments strategies, as well as for providers. Significant 
advancements in medical technologies in the 1950s and 1960s, the continued 
expansion of the number of insured workers, and President Johnson’s passage of 
amendments to the Social Security Act, increased the cost of health care and the 
complexity of the American health care system exponentially. 14 
 
 
13 Thomasson, Melissa. From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century Development of U.S. Health Insurance. 
Explorations in Economic History. July 2002. Vol. 39 (3). Pgs. 233-253. doi:10.1006/exeh.2002.0788. 





THE DIGITIZATION OF HEALTH CARE 
“I know there’s a proverb which says, ‘To err is human,’ but a human error is nothing 
compared to what a computer can do if it tries.” 
- Agatha Christie, Hallowe’en Party 
The complexity of the American health care system has grown substantially in 
the era of health information technology (IT). Beginning with the rise of personal 
computing in the 1970s and 1980s, through the advent of the internet in the 1990s, the 
rapid adoption of electronic health records in the 2000s, and the surge of big data and 
analytics in the 2010s and beyond, health IT has rapidly become the driving force 
behind health care innovation. Health IT now includes a broad array of technologies 
deployed throughout every function of the health care system, including clinical, 
operational, compliance, billing, and finance. These technologies include electronic 
health records, communications systems, patient monitoring, imaging, laboratory 
systems, and telehealth, to name a few. Adding to the complexity of health IT is that all 
of these areas are tightly interwoven. Therefore, any policy or regulatory change 
implemented within the health care system will inherently have broad implications not 
only for the area targeted by the policy or regulation, but for multiple other areas as 
well.15 Unanticipated consequences are the norm, and a multitude of administrative and 
 
15 “Electronic Health Records; Patient Safety Primer”. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. PSNet. Last 




technical processes in the health IT management of a health care organization are 
focused on how to respond to unanticipated effects of change.16  
Health care is not the only, and certainly not the first, industry to contend with the 
complexities and pressures of integrating technology into established practice. The 
business world has been adapting to rapid advancements in technology which have 
spurred inclinations toward globalization and shifting economic markets since the rise of 
the knowledge economy in the post-industrial era.17 These changes have caused 
companies to expand their teams to deal with a growing number of external business 
partners and challenged the ability of corporations to limit its physical presence to a 
specific geographic location. To accommodate these changes businesses have adopted 
the practice of video-conferencing technologies, to allow for a virtual “face to face” 
meeting for team members in multiple locations.18 Over the last two decades this 
practice has led to the creation of a multi-billion-dollar industry focused on video 
conferencing platforms and their use in other fields such as education and personal 
communication.  
The banking sector is another industry which has been significantly impacted by 
technology. Widely available network connectivity, cybersecurity protocols, online 
banking and mobile technology have driven banks to leverage these innovations to 
 
16 “Guide to Reducing Unintended Consequences of Electronic Health records.” The Office of the National 
Coordinator. HealthIT.gov. 2019. https://www.healthit.gov/unintended-consequences/ 





18 Jon Martin Denstadli, Tom Erik Julsrud, and Randi Johanne Hjorthol. 2012. “Videoconferencing as a Mode of 
Communication: A Comparative Study of the Use of Videoconferencing and Face-to-Face Meetings.” Journal of 




revolutionize the means by which consumers and businesses interact with financial 
institutions. In 2017, 1.51 billion mobile devices were sold in the United States, with 
global expansion of the market exceeding the rate in the U.S.19 With 96% of all 
Americans having access to mobile technology,20 the ways in which all markets are 
approaching provision of their services has changed. The health care industry is no 
different. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of mobile device users who downloaded 
at least one mobile health application onto their device doubled.21 The increasing 
consumer demand for added value in health care and disruptions caused by these 
emerging innovations has spurred the health industry to also reassess the manner in 
which it provides care to patients. With the U.S. experiencing trends such as an aging 
population, increases in chronic disease rates,22 increased health care disparities 
between differing ethnic groups and between rural and urban populations,23 and 
skyrocketing health care costs, the expansion of technologies to address these issues is 
increasingly key. However, the adoption of information technology and advanced 
telecommunication into health care has lagged other industries. In fact, many health 
care institutions still rely heavily on pagers, paper records, and fax machines, despite 
the explosion of video communication, big data and analytics and digital information 
exchange in other sectors. 24 This is due in part to the size and complexity of the 
 
19 Andy Boxall. 2019. “In 2018, smartphone sales stopped growing annually for the first time.” Digital Trends. 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/2018-smartphone-sales-decline-news/ 
20 Pew Research Center: Internet and Technology. Last updated June 12, 2019. https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ 




23 Kendal Orgera and Smantha Artiga. 2018. “Disparities in Health and Health Care: Five Key Questions and 
Answers.” Kaiser Family Foundation. https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/disparities-in-health-and-health-
care-five-key-questions-and-answers/ 





industry but is significantly complicated by the sensitivity and intense regulation around 
patient data, as well as concerns for patient safety. 
In such an unpredictable and complex environment, a high level of expertise is required 
to inform meaningful policy and regulatory changes. Effective health IT policy 
development often requires extensive involvement by experts in clinical care, data 
science, informatics, finance, epidemiology, operations, and business, not to mention 
the obvious required expertise in legislative process and in the relevant technology. The 
variety of clinical disciplines and wide array of technologies utilized in health care further 
expands the field of required expertise.  
Of course, the more experts that become involved in the legislative process, the greater 
the potential for differences of opinion, particularly when various experts are 
approaching a problem from a different silo of expertise. The business solutions to 
health care’s problems, as determined by experts in health care finance and 
management, for example, do not always align with the optimal clinical solutions or ideal 
technical solutions, as determined by experts in those areas. Thus, the difficulty of 
developing well-informed and impactful health care IT policies is compounded further.  
This is perhaps best exemplified by the federal policy and regulation surrounding 
Electronic Health Records (EHR), which were originally conceived as a means of 
decreasing medical errors, improving patient care, and increasing provider efficiency. 






adoption of EHRs were incorporated into the language of the American Reinvestment 
and Recovery Act (ARRA), in 2009.25 However, implementation of EHRs across the 
country was slow and inconsistent, and while additional regulations imposed on health 
care systems around EHRs in the 2015 Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
(MACRA) accelerated the pace of implementation, it did not improve the EHR’s 
effectiveness at addressing the problems it was originally meant to address.26 In 
addition, industry factors led to persistent problems with information blocking and a lack 
of interoperability by competing EHR vendors. All this has largely influenced the current 
health care landscape, where much of the blame for the epidemic of physician burnout 
and continuously increasing costs is placed on the very technology that was conceived 
as a solution to these issues. 
With even more new and emerging technologies such as telehealth, (an example this 
thesis will continue to highlight given its enormous growth and impact during the COVID 
Pandemic response), remote patient monitoring, wearable devices, artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, and advanced analytics, this wide array of expertise must also be 
supplemented by academic research into the implementation and impact of these 
technologies. Unlike other technology sectors, the requirement of rigorous scientific 
evidence to inform practice change is deeply ingrained into the health care system, and 
for good reason. Unanticipated effects and ineffective solutions in health care have life 
and death consequences, and an immense research infrastructure has developed 
 
25 Taylor Burke. 2010. “The Health Information Technology Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice.” Public Health Reports. Jan-Feb; 125(1): 141–145. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2789830/ 






around and within health care to minimize such negative impacts. Still, the pace of 
technology development is often at odds with the need for rigorous clinical and 
translational research, leading to a chaotic environment that has seen more than its fair 
share of dramatic standoffs and failures. 
THE POLICY LEADS VS. POLICY FOLLOWS ARGUMENTS 
Telehealth is the use of electronic communications, including real-time audio-video, 
remote monitoring, e-consenting, and other approaches, in the delivery of health care 
services. Telehealth has vast potential to address the Institute for Health care 
Improvement’s (IHI), Quadruple Aim for Health Systems: improving the health of 
populations, reducing per-capita costs, improving the patient experience of care, and 
improving the work-lives of health care providers.27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
 
27 S. Al Kasab, J. B. Harvey, E. Debenham, D. J. Jones, N. Turner, and C. A. Holmstedt. . 2018  "Door to Needle 
Time over Telestroke-A Comprehensive Stroke Center Experience."  Telemed J E Health 24 (2):111-115. doi: 
10.1089/tmj.2017.0067. 
28 M. Barnett. L., H. F. Yee, A. Mehrotra, and P. Giboney. 2017. "Los Angeles Safety-Net Program eConsult System 
Was Rapidly Adopted And Decreased Wait Times To See Specialists."  Health Aff (Millwood) 36 (3):492-499. doi: 
10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1283 
29 M. Becevic,  S. Boren, R. Mutrux, Z. Shah, and S. Banerjee. 2015. "User Satisfaction With Telehealth: Study of 
Patients, Providers, and Coordinators."  Health Care Manag (Frederick) 34 (4):337-49. doi: 
10.1097/HCM.0000000000000081 
30 M. E. Davalos, M. T. French, A. E. Burdick, and S. C. Simmons. 2009. "Economic evaluation of telemedicine: 
review of the literature and research guidelines for benefit-cost analysis."  Telemedicine journal and e-health : the 
official journal of the American Telemedicine Association 15 (10):933-948. doi: 10.1089/tmj.2009.0067 [doi] 
31 M. Dharmar, P. S. Romano, N. Kuppermann, T. S. Nesbitt, S. L. Cole, E. R. Andrada, D. Vance,  Jillian Harvey, 
and James P. Marcin. 2013. "Impact of critical care telemedicine consultations on children in rural emergency 
departments."  Critical Care Medicine 41 (10):2388-2395. doi: 10.1097/CCM.0b013e31828e9824 [doi] 
32 James  P. Marcin. 2013. "Telemedicine in the pediatric intensive care unit."  Pediatric clinics of North America 60 
(3):581-592. doi: 10.1016/j.pcl.2013.02.002 [doi] 
33 B. Odeh, R. Kayyali, S. Nabhani-Gebara, N. Philip, P. Robinson, and C. R. Wallace. 2015. "Evaluation of a 
Telehealth Service for COPD and HF patients: Clinical outcome and patients' perceptions."  J Telemed Telecare 21 
(5):292-7. doi: 10.1177/1357633X15574807 
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The early advancement of telehealth has been driven more by theoretical impact than 
by rigorous research and development of best practices. Additionally, state-to-state 
variation in regulations, reimbursement, and wide discrepancies in resources result in 
great variability across institutions in telehealth practice and provision of services.35  
Just as existing telehealth policies and regulations are not fully developed, there are 
generally two well accepted but not necessarily well-defined arguments regarding how 
to best approach fostering sound telehealth legislation and regulation. 
The Policy Leads Argument 
It is a widely-held belief among many in the telehealth industry that rigorous academic 
telehealth research is both unnecessary to the advancement of telehealth services and 
prohibitively slow. The thought is that the development and large-scale adoption of 
telehealth services should be driven largely by innovation and consumer-focused 
competitive factors such as improved convenience for patients and efficiency or income 
for providers. This school of thought views telehealth under much the same lens as one 
might view Netflix, Amazon, or the iPhone: a new and promising technology that will 
ultimately reach a tipping point of adoption without waiting for academic research to 
catch up to evolving practice. 
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Policy development in this school of thought is seen as a necessary first step to hasten 
this advancement by lightening the regulatory burden on telehealth providers and 
eliminating or reducing reimbursement barriers.  Academic research is not seen as a 
central component to this advancement but rather as a likely outcome of it.   
The conduct of such high-level research requires policies and legislation to support 
sufficient data acquisition. According to a 2018 policy report: 
Disciplines that assess the impact of technology on institutions and enterprises 
encounter the same problem, as advancements in technology often outpace the 
production of peer-reviewed research. By the time such research is published, 
the technological landscape has likely changed in a way that limits practitioners’ 
and policymakers’ ability to employ its findings.36 
In this school of thought, policy studies and industry reports are most critical to the 
timely progress of activities that employ advanced technologies.  
From this perspective, the passage of a federal parity law and advocacy for a state-by-
state, broadly framed and uniform parity law, is ideal. Once these policies push the 
adoption of telehealth over the critical tipping point, making telehealth practice 
ubiquitous across the health care service spectrum, academic research will naturally 
follow. The concern, however, is that a lack of academic telehealth research will both 
inhibit adoption by academically-minded providers and lead to the advancement of 
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largely profit-driven telehealth services that prioritize return on investment over patient 
outcomes and population health impacts. It is not surprising then that the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) does not accept industry-driven outcomes as non-biased 
reporting, meriting the same weight as research conducted within the standards of 
contemporary academic frameworks.  
 
The Policy Follows Argument 
The lack of a robust evidence base supporting the impact of telehealth has substantially 
impaired large-scale adoption of telehealth by both providers and patients. The CBO has 
specifically requested that more research be conducted on the impact of telehealth on 
health care spending, to allow an accurate analysis of proposals to expand Medicare 
coverage of telehealth.37 
The dilemma is that the growth and adoption of telehealth services is limited by the lack 
of evidence supporting its effectiveness, but the development of a quality telehealth 
evidence base is, in turn, limited by the lack of sufficient growth and adoption to have the 
service volume needed to conduct adequately powered, relevant and impactful 
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research.38 39 40 41 42 Thus, concerted collaborative efforts are needed to develop a 
research culture in telehealth, and to develop a national platform for multisite telehealth 
research.  In order for telehealth research to advance in a timely enough fashion to keep 
pace with the advancements in technologies and business practices of telehealth, 
researchers must bring together the scientific community to promote thorough 
examination, identify and prioritize telehealth research needs, catalyze collaborative, 
multisite research studies, catalogue emerging best practices and study design 
methodologies, and disseminate findings and new knowledge. 
It is the identification and prioritization of telehealth research needs that can be most 
effectively served through the simultaneous integration of health care policy evaluation 
and strategy. Through evaluation of existing state and federal telehealth policy, 
regulations, and guidelines, research can be targeted toward meaningful studies that will 
address the current gaps in telehealth policies and drive the development of impactful 
policies at the state and federal level.   
A key component of this approach is the evaluation of the economic impacts of telehealth 
services, including health care costs, direct and downstream revenue, return on 
investment, and reimbursement policies.  If health care cost and efficiency issues are 
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considered prospectively as research questions, designs, and data collection plans 
evolve, then the data gathered from those studies will be more likely to impact financial 
projections used in policy development and scoring, such as by the CBO. This 
considered, practical, and rigorous scientific approach has the greatest potential to lead 
to the development of the safest and most effective telehealth services. However, the 
rapid pace of telehealth development may inhibit a full adoption of this methodology. 
WHAT IS EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE? 
Although the practice of modern medicine has long been based on clinical and basic 
science research, it was not until the late 1960s that increased awareness of the 
weakness in clinical decision making began to be scrutinized by members of the 
medical community who were concerned about gaps in evidence and wide variations in 
clinical judgment. From this began a movement to increase the awareness of these 
failings and apply clear evaluation of the evidence of effectiveness in the dissemination 
of both clinical practice guidelines and population focused policies. The term Evidence 
Based Medicine (EBM), was first used in 1990 by David Eddy in an article published in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association and a subsequent series of 28 papers 
describing the need for, and the process of, creating evidence-based medicine. 43 
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How does this differ from Translational Research (also called Translational 
Science)? 
The fundamental purpose of translational science is to create a new framework for 
medical research, the goals of which are: to build upon previous clinical study to create 
broader applications of science, ensure that those applications ultimately find relevance 
for the public, realize common acceptance (EBM), and influence public policy decisions. 
Broadly, it is meant to bring basic science out of the lab and create practical advances 
for the good of society. In 2004, The National Institutes of Health (NIH) pioneered the 
concept of translational medicine and established the Clinical and Translational Science 
Awards (CTSAs), which were granted to academic medical centers around the country 
to create a system of collaborative hubs, working in concert to institute the aims of the 
NIH’s purpose.44 45 
In 2008, the NIH further refined the framework to include four phases of translational 
medicine. Commonly referred to as phases T1, T2, T3, and T4, these stages represent 
the full process beginning with bench research and ending with the conversion of all the 
stages into evidenced based clinical application to population health-based models of 
care deployment and policy development. Policy work is incorporated in both the T3 and 
T4 phases, although T4 is the space within which most traditional policy work occurs. 
T4 is defined by the NIH as: 
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Community to Public Health: T4 research evaluates the implementation and 
efficacy of policies and accepted medical practices, as they impact individual and 
public health outcomes. T4 research may include cost–benefit analysis, policy 
analysis, surveillance studies, and program evaluation.46  
CONCLUSION  
The pace of increasing complexity in our health care system shows no signs of slowing 
in the near future. Technology has historically served as a driving force in the evolution 
of health care, while also contributing substantially to that complexity. Identifying a clear 
path forward in such a challenging environment may therefore seem like an 
insurmountable task. But policy development guided by science and expertise, as it has 
in the past, can guide us forward in the future. It is not always the easiest path to take, 
and can often require patience, careful proactive planning, and some sacrifice of 
political agendas. The next chapter will delve into recent case studies of policy that has 
not followed research, the lessons that we can learn from those experiences, and the 
economic underpinnings of our health care system that create many of the unique 
circumstances that policymakers must navigate.  
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CHAPTER 2 – Lead from Behind: Why a “Policy 
Follows” Approach is the Best Way to Lead Health 
Care Forward 
INTRODUCTION 
The American healthcare system has become a self-perpetuating behemoth. 
Incrementalist approaches to change often have limited impact. Any gains made rapidly 
evaporate as the system adjusts to maintain its status quo, like lobbing a water balloon 
into a raging housefire. Conversely, passage of aggressive, transformational health care 
legislation not only requires the expenditure of enormous political capital, but due to the 
unique, layered complexities of our system, the consequences of such considerable 
change are often difficult to predict. 
Health care Information Technology (IT) is central to the operation and evolution of our 
health care system, but developing policies to address advancements in technology 
adds yet another layer of complexity to the policy-making process. Conventional 
wisdom in health care IT policy is that aggressive technology policies can drive 
innovation. Policies supporting promising new innovations by decreasing regulatory 
hurdles or incentivizing adoption will drive implementation of new technologies and the 
possible, resulting benefits to the system. But legislating within a poorly-understood 
health care environment risks more than political retaliation—it risks lives. And thus, 






and regulations impacting health care IT is critical to creating successful legislation. In 
such a complex field, this understanding requires patience, research, and the help of 
experts. 
In this complicated environment, how do we successfully advance effective and safe 
health IT policy?  My thesis is that driving effective health IT policy requires that policy 
follows research and expertise—that we must prioritize evidence-based policy in the 
same way that health care professionals prioritize evidence-based medicine. We have 
seen repeatedly that, when policy leads in an effort to drive innovation or financial 
outcomes, the unforeseen consequences often greatly outweigh any achievements and 
in a system such as ours, such missteps can be a difficult thing from which to recover.  
Policy leads is an environment wherein lawmakers and regulators put into place 
legislation that dictates or encourages certain behaviors by creating rules around 
payment and imposing penalties for non-compliance. Policy follows, by contrast, 
describes an environment where technological innovation in health care drives practice 
change through research and evidence, and those researchers and other experts in the 
field of medicine are then called upon to identify policy alternatives for legislators based 
on scientific evidence and data, that would further advance the broad adoption of 
successful practices.  
This chapter’s purpose is two-fold. It explores the economic and political theories, and 
their broadly drawn ideological counterparts, upon which the politico-economic 
framework of our health care system is built, and provides illustrative case studies which 






ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL THEORIES  
Market Failures and Driving Innovation 
The exceptional level of difficulty in creating quality and lasting health care policy and 
reform is in part due to the incredible complexity of the U.S. health care system itself. 
There are many dynamic and powerful players within the system, including consumers, 
care providers, hospitals and clinics, pharmaceutical companies and insurance 
companies, and the economic impact is immense. In 2018, the healthcare sector of our 
economy accounted for the nation’s largest amount of spending at $3.65 trillion, up 
4.6% from 2017, a rate of growth faster than that of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
within the same year.47  All of these variables lead to convoluted interactions between 
the governmental branches and regulatory agencies and fierce competition amongst 
interest groups for a prominent role in setting the policy agenda and guiding legislative 
outcomes.  
In the most general terms, economic analysis of health care is complicated for two 
reasons. The more basic problem is that a supply and demand analysis, which should 
deal with delivery of service from physicians (suppliers) to patients/consumers 
(demanders), is distorted by the gatekeepers. Both for-profit and government insurers 
distort the outcomes regarding price and quantity: the price paid, and the quantity 
consumed. Patients cannot determine their cost of care because there are at least three 
payment routes. The first route is through taxes. A portion of our income goes to 
 







Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Plan (CHIP), and insurance 
marketplace subsidies mandated in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). In 2019, these four 
programs accounted for 1.1 trillion dollars or twenty-five percent of our nation’s overall 
budget. The breakdown of how much of that spending goes to each program depends 
on numerous variables, and states must match the amount of federal payments for 
Medicaid and CHIP.48 The second payment route for care is a patient’s insurance 
premium. The premium amount is usually difficult to decipher and is only roughly 
reflected on a payroll slip listing an individual’s net deposit. Insurance premiums vary 
widely depending on the contract between the employer and the insurance provider. 
The final payment route for consumers are co-pays, which also vary widely depending 
on the type of service rendered and the period of time during which the services are 
received. Possibly more surprising, is that the suppliers (physicians), also do not often 
know the cost of the care they provide (which determines the supply relationship), or the 
prices, which vary because they are determined by health system negotiations with 
insurers. 
Secondly, health care markets actually fail for some—or many—of the defined reasons 
any market may fail: equity, externalities, market power, and asymmetric information. 
The only defined market failure that doesn’t apply to health care is the public good 
argument.49 This argument states that some goods are non-rival, meaning that one 
more person’s use of the good doesn’t lessen the amount available to everyone else. 
The prime example of a non-rival good is national defense; i.e. one person’s use of the 
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national defense does not lessen another’s. Health care is a rival good, as anyone who 
has sat in an emergency room or waited any length of time for an appointment, can 
attest to. It is highly congested. Furthermore, in economic thinking, one person’s 
medical intervention does not help another person. Here, it is important to highlight the 
difference between rival and non-rival goods and positive and negative externalities. An 
externality is a situation in which the market transaction between two parties helps 
(positive externality) or hurts (negative externality) a third person. The conflation 
between the two is often made when considering the importance of public health 
interventions such as vaccines. Vaccines are an example of a relatively simple market 
transaction between one person and a large third party, in which the good provides a 
positive outcome for many people. However, this describes a positive externality not a 
non-rival good, as the one dose of vaccine can only be used by one person.  
Much of the government’s promotion of health care outcomes is based on the fact that 
there is a strong positive externality to public health, something the CCMC’s research 
had proven by the early 1930s. Good health benefits more than the healthy in terms of 
not spreading disease and in terms of strong economic outcomes. And it is worth noting 
that economists have often argued that medical research should also be considered a 
public good.50 Yet only 2% of our annual national budget in 2019 was earmarked for 
science and medical research.51  
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In fact, the explanation for all government intervention in any sector of the economy is a 
market failure. A non-health care example is the case of negative externalities like 
pollution, for which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created. The 
government’s reaction to mounting concerns over health care equity issues in the U.S., 
resulted in legislation enacting the so-called entitlement programs, including Medicare 
and Medicaid, CHIP, Social Security and welfare. All of which, as was described earlier, 
was necessarily passed in a piecemeal, policy leads fashion due to prevailing political 
agendas and strong special interest lobbies. 
Another complication of our layered health care system is the power insurance 
companies wield in determining cost and payment. Many have argued that insurance 
companies tend toward monopoly power. The tendency toward monopoly is collusion, in 
which for-profit companies find ways to agree to provide only certain products and to do 
so at similar prices. In order to combat this tendency, Congress passed anti-trust laws. 
The extent to which insurance companies lean toward exerting a monopoly power is 
often debated, but clearly there are enough companies competing that anti-trust laws 
are not triggered.  
Asymmetric information, another of the causes listed above for market failure, can be 
defined as “a situation in which information is unequally distributed between the 
individuals in a transaction.” Government intervention is extremely ineffective at 
combating asymmetric information.52 Unfortunately, the insurance industry suffers from 
this failure and combats it by attempting to limit its exposure to paying claims, hence the 
 







legislative reforms of the ACA requiring coverage of those with preexisting conditions or 
those already too ill to work. Asymmetric information is also apparent when we again 
consider a supply and demand analysis in which consumers (patients) don’t know the 
cost of a service, what options may exist, the effects of physician recommendations for 
treatment (or non-treatment), the role insurance companies play in the 
recommendations of physicians, etc.  
Market Maximized versus Market Minimized: The Political Economy of Health 
Care  
There has been a long history of aligning political parties with economic thought. In very 
broad terms, those who believe markets should control most of our economic choices 
can be labeled market maximizers. These subscribers tend to have certain political 
casts and may be labeled neo-liberal. Advocates of this theory downplay the role and 
effect of market failures in most situations and generally indicate that they feel that 
government intervention intended to right market failures limits the free will, both of the 
consumers on the demand side and the providers on the supply side. Conservative 
thinkers may argue that there are indeed market failures, but that government 
intervention does more harm than good. 53 
On the other side of the political and economic aisle are the progressive voices, who 
espouse that failures of the market are real and that government intervention is often 
the only solution—even if not the perfect one—because private companies involved in 
 







the pursuit of profit are not often motivated to care for equity, or the benefits of positive 
externalities, or the costs of negative externalities. For the sake of rhetorical and 
ideological symmetry these advocates may be referred to as market minimizers. 
However, in reality, they do not argue for government intervention in more than a 
handful of markets.54  
One of the relevant arguments in light of these views involves how the market is related 
to innovation. Those who advocate for maximized markets often claim that the race for 
profits spurs innovation. A company spends large sums to develop a new technology, or 
a new drug, for example, in the hope of making significant profits if its research pays off. 
Market maximizers would argue that a firm deprived of its profits by the government will 
not bother to innovate nor to improve efficiency. This may be true. It does not prohibit 
another group, independent researchers at universities, for example, from conducting 
research on innovative new products. Nor does it prohibit regulators from promoting 
efficiency. It does, however, remove some profit motives. 
Consider another supply and demand illustration, this time for health care technology. 
Its product is different from the supply and demand described above. The product 
analyzed above is for a health care outcome, say an hour of service, regardless of the 
outcome—health care is the product. For the health care technology analysis, the 
product is something that supposedly increases efficiency, for example telehealth. This 
evaluation presents fewer problems in and of itself because it is now clear who the 
providers are and who the demanders are—health care providers are now on the 
 






demand side of the equation. Still, externality and equity issues remain and government 
must step in to remedy these concerns.  
Yet it is clear that government involvement can backfire, and I believe the reason is 
twofold. First, is the lack of clarity, to even the most engaged and educated on the 
subject. If, for argument’s sake, both sides of the body politic could come to some 
agreement of market failures, policymakers could have a much clearer conversation 
about when government intervention is needed and what it is likely to achieve. The 
other concern is that the original health care supply and demand analysis, the one 
focusing on care, is so convoluted at this point, that this more limited consideration 
becomes convoluted as well, and we find ourselves back at the beginning of the 
endless game of the partisan political economy versus evidence based policy. 
One plausible way to begin to simplify the approach to legislating the health care 
technology market is to ensure that the innovations that government promotes into the 
health care market are based on rigorous, academic research. We require solidity in a 
sea of regulations, the necessary ones and the unnecessary. From this perspective, the 
policy follows research approach, in some ways becomes the equivalent of a profit 
motive. Policy follows provides a sound rationale for government support of evidenced 
based health care innovation as opposed to clumsy political attempts to enforce new 
technology standards that merely seem like good ideas. The following case studies 
provide notable examples of failed government attempts to guide innovation in health 
care by a policy leads approach and highlights the importance of the adoption of a 







The complexity of the U.S. health care system has grown substantially in the era of 
health care information technology. Health care information technology (IT) includes a 
broad array of technologies deployed throughout every function of the health care 
system, including clinical, operational, compliance, billing, and finance. These 
technologies include electronic health records, communications systems, patient 
monitoring, imaging, laboratory systems, and telehealth, to name a few. Adding to the 
complexity of health IT is that all of these areas are tightly interwoven. Therefore, any 
policy or regulatory change implemented within the health care system will inherently 
have broad implications not only for the area targeted by the policy or regulation, but for 
multiple other areas as well. Unanticipated consequences are the norm, and when 
policy leads, without a strong basis in evidence and the adequate guidance from health 
care and research experts, those unanticipated consequences can have long-lasting 
and far-reaching negative impacts on the system. 
Integration of research into the development of health information technology policy and 
regulation, the policy follows approach, is critical to minimize unforeseen negative 
impacts. According to John Kingdon’s seminal work on roles played by non-
governmental groups in policymaking, academics do not have as much influence as 
interest groups over the formation of an agenda, but they do tend to be the experts 
legislators rely on most for identifying alternatives to existing problems within a given 
agenda or policy, and they may influence the prevailing themes of scientific focus.55 In 
 






short, academics generate the established wisdom surrounding policy problems which 
often informs the way policymakers approach the writing of legislation. A policy follows 
approach dictates that this influence must be even more powerful in the health care 
sector, as even prevailing schools of thought acknowledge that health care provision 
cannot be treated as a traditional producer-consumer interaction.  
 
Case Study 1: The Unexpected Consequences of the Electronic Health Record: 
Good Intentions Still Require Good Data 
One of the most prominent examples of this complexity and failure of the policy leads 
approach is the federal policy and regulation surrounding Electronic Health Records 
(EHR), which demonstrates that even the best innovations can exacerbate problems in 
health care when pushed forward aggressively by policy, without the necessary 
evidence to guide effective implementation. EHRs were originally conceived as a means 
of decreasing medical errors, improving patient care, and increasing provider efficiency. 
The prevalence and astonishing impact of medical errors within the health care system 
received worldwide attention in 1999 when the Institute of Medicine published the 
groundbreaking study, To Err is Human, which found that “as many as 98,000 people 
die in any given year from medical errors that occur in hospitals.”56 The Obama 
administration recognized the promise of EHRs to address these high profile concerns 
in the American health care system and incorporated incentives for adoption of EHRs 
into the language of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA), in 2009. 
 






However, implementation of the relatively new and unproven technology across the 
country remained inconsistent, and so additional policies were enacted in the 2015 
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) to accelerate the pace of 
implementation. However, without research and evidence to guide the effective 
implementation of EHRs in the clinical space, this accelerated adoption simply added 
complexity for already overloaded health care workers and increased regulatory 
requirements for documentation and compliance. In addition, competitive industry 
factors led to persistent problems with information blocking and a lack of interoperability 
by competing EHR vendors. All this has largely influenced the current health care 
landscape, where much of the blame for the epidemic of physician burnout and 
continuously increasing costs is placed on the very technology that was intended to be 
a solution to these concerns. 
 
Case Study 2: Legislating in the Dark: When the Laboratories of Democracy are 
Run by Politicians in White Coats 
When writing language employed for health care policy state officials must strike a 
careful balance between specificity and ambiguity. Language that is too specific has the 
potential to lead to both unintended restrictions and unanticipated loopholes to 
circumvent the policy. Language which is too vague can prove difficult to interpret and 
apply in specific scenarios, may weaken the impact of the policy, and may leave those 
advocating for the policy feeling as though it lacks the necessary teeth. A policy follows 






can be a key factor in informing that balance, and if scientific evidence is unavailable or 
insufficient, the resulting legislation can undermine the goals of the policy. 
An illustrative example of this issue is found in the wide variety of state telehealth parity 
legislation and regulation around the country. Parity legislation and regulations serve to 
regulate payment from private and public insurers for the provision of telehealth 
services, just as they would for in-person health services. According to the Center for 
Connected Health Policy, forty-two states and the District of Columbia currently have 
legislation that governs private payer reimbursement of telehealth services, while all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia include some form of reimbursement regulation for 
telehealth services, through either private or public payers. Only ten states have passed 
total parity laws—in which all payers reimburse exactly the same amount for every 
service provided—regardless of the delivery modality. However, the language found in 
different parity laws across the country varies markedly, which can have a dramatic 
impact on the development of telehealth services in those states.57 The term “parity” 
refers to the fact that early legislation was aimed at ensuring uniformly equal payment 
for telehealth services compared to similar services provided face-to-face. However, the 
language of current parity laws often diverges markedly from that early goal, at times 
creating restrictions to reimbursement or regulatory hurdles for telehealth services 
where none previously existed. Because of a lack of rigorous scientific data to guide 
state parity legislative language, variation across states compounded, as the expected 
impact of such legislation was based on the theories and opinions of the various 
 








stakeholders engaged in the policy development process in each state—rather than on 
evidence of actual impacts. This environment created a confusing milieu of regulations 
across the country, which was particularly problematic for a technology that was 
designed to allow doctors to reach patients regardless of their geographic location. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has created a seismic shift in both state and federal telehealth 
coverage and payment legislation and regulations through waiver mechanisms and 
emergency declarations, but these changes are temporary, with many waived 
regulations reverting back to the pre-pandemic state, either at a specified date or once 
the emergency declaration has ended. As the nation was forced to shift dependence 
from in-person, traditional care, to care via remote technologies—policymakers, hospital 
systems, and clinicians alike—found themselves struggling to devise ways to provide 
the technology in the most efficient and practical ways. The policy and regulatory 
environment around telehealth was, by necessity, simplified and streamlined around the 
country.  
As the health care system looks toward emerging from the pandemic response, the 
debate about how to continue to provide these services in a post-pandemic era and the 
variability across states in pre-pandemic policies, leads to questions that can only 
effectively be answered with a policy follows approach. Since telehealth policies prior to 
the pandemic were driven more by the concerns of private payers, for-profit companies, 
and powerful special interest groups, the data to guide new policies is largely lacking. 
Without research to inform the drafting of new, more consistent statutes regarding the 






than before, as the health care landscape has forever been altered by this pandemic. 
However, a shift in focus for health care IT policy to the advancement of research into 
best practices for telehealth and health IT will allow for not only more effective 
implementation, but more consistency across the country. 
 
Case Study 3: The Cautionary Tale of Theranos: When Government Elites 
Embrace Alchemy 
 A balance between multiple stakeholders is crucial to the proper regulation and 
evolution of health care technology. When an appropriate balance between industry 
influence, policy makers, regulatory agencies, scientists, and clinicians is not 
maintained, failures can result. When regulations and policies are driven by hype rather 
than real evidence, those failures can be dramatic. 
 In 2003, nineteen-year-old Stanford University dropout, Elizabeth Holmes founded a 
Silicon Valley start-up called Theranos, which claimed it could deliver scientifically 
accurate results on a broad array of diagnostic tests using only the amount of blood 
provided by a finger-stick capillary sample. Holmes alleged that this technology, dubbed 
The Edison, held the potential to disrupt the health care sector, decreasing the system’s 
reliance on painful and anxiety-provoking venous blood sampling from patients, 
delivering results in a matter of a few hours (versus the traditional span of several days), 
and decreasing the costs to Medicare and Medicaid by nearly half. These benefits, 






laboratory tests independent of their health care provider, eliminating the cumbersome 
intermediary step of obtaining a physician order for lab tests—a step that was primarily 
serving as a barrier to efficiency and patient autonomy.58 Holmes leveraged the 
considerable media attention she received to accrue nearly $700 million in venture 
capitalist financing, assemble a powerful and influential board of investors that included 
former Secretaries of Defense, Henry Kissinger and George Schulz, and then retired 
Four-Star Army General, James Mattis. Holmes was able to make lucrative deals in 
which she opened “Wellness Centers” in forty-two Walgreens located in Pennsylvania, 
California, and Arizona. In 2015 she successfully lobbied the Arizona legislature to pass 
a law allowing consumers to order any panel of tests they wished from the Theranos 
menu, without an order from their physician. This caught the attention of government 
officials who recognized the political appeal of consumer autonomy and potential cost-
savings—and simultaneously—the ire of HMO and medical insurance companies who 
recognized the potential disruption of the insurance industry’s traditional role as a 
gatekeeper for health care services. Prominent political powers of the time continued to 
take interest in both the positive press and money-making potential of the company, 
including the Clintons who invited her to speak at the Clinton Foundation Health Access 
Initiative forum and accepted her invitation to host a fund-raiser for then presidential-
candidate Hilary Clinton. (Mrs. Clinton later cancelled the fund-raiser when stories of 
improper regulatory strategies began to circulate). In March of 2018, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), filed a lawsuit against Holmes59 and her former Chief 
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Operating Officer, Sunny Balwani, claiming that they had defrauded investors, 
businesses, and consumers, by misleading investors as to their accurate financial 
status, misleading businesses and the American government about the Edison’s true 
capabilities and accuracy, and lying to investors about the regulatory status of their 
technology. The Department of Justice also filed suit against the two charging them with 
eleven criminal felony counts, in April of 2018.60 Theranos is now defunct. Holmes 
settled her SEC case in early 2019 but Balwani’s SEC case is still pending. Both 
Holmes and Balwani are awaiting their criminal trials.61 
The story of Theranos is now cited as a cautionary tale for Silicon Valley start-ups, who 
are known to employ dubious strategies to avoid the hurdles associated with regulatory 
compliance. Jina Choi, lead counsel for the SEC in the case, was quoted as saying, 
“The Theranos story is an important lesson for Silicon Valley. Innovators who seek to 
revolutionize and disrupt an industry must tell investors the truth about what their 
technology can do today, not just what they hope it might do someday.”62 However, it is 
not only the technological industry that has been put on notice. There are warnings, too 
for regulatory agencies and state and federal policymakers. The current regulatory 
environment is steeped in the constraints of adversarial legalism. Intense pressures 
from Congress, the Executive Branch, and influential interest groups to not issue 
regulations which will dampen the economic contributions of the technology sector (both 
to the nation’s GDP and to some of the political elite within its systems), frequently 
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compete with the need to create regulations for the sake of consumer and patient 
safety. But this can often be further complicated when the evolution of the technology, 
or in the case of Theranos, the perceived evolution, outpaces the ability of governing 
agencies and officials to provide the due diligence required when writing effective rules. 
CONCLUSION 
How do we move forward safe and effective health IT policy? My thesis is that effective 
policy development must be guided by strong scientific evidence from rigorous research 
and knowledgeable experts. Such an evidence-based policy model facilitates greater 
precision in policy language and allows for more accurate prediction of the impact of 
policies on costs, access to care, and quality. The policy follows approach is particularly 
necessary and impactful when legislating health IT. The evolution of the U.S. health 
care system was initially driven effectively by advances in technology, but politics and 
industry stakeholders have become increasingly dominant forces over time, which has 
led to an expensive, inefficient, and stubbornly stagnant system. As described above, 
traditional economic models fail to fully address the complexity of this uniquely 
American health care environment. A policy leads model or approach, which attempts to 
apply traditional economic principals to health care by creating financial incentives or 
imposing penalties to encourage the adoption of technology, often creates as many 







The case studies described above detail the pitfalls of a policy leads approach. The 
rushed implementation of electronic health records into clinical practice shows that 
policies enacted to push adoption of unproven health care technology can have long-
lasting negative consequences. The experience with variable state parity legislation for 
telehealth demonstrates that insufficient or inadequate research data can complicate 
policy development and lead to inconsistent, overly restrictive, or vague and confusing 
policy language. Finally, the cautionary tale of Theranos warns that media hype and 
pressure from powerful stakeholders can lead to policy and regulatory changes that put 
the safety of patients and the quality of health care at risk. 
 A policy follows approach would align policy makers, innovators, researchers, health 
care providers, and payers toward the same goals and facilitate a unified path for 
advancement of policy and regulation by: 1) developing technology that positively 
impacts the health of populations, the efficiency of the system, and the costs of care; 2) 
supporting research and data collection to prove that it works; and 3) developing 
policies and regulation to support the broad adoption of the proven technology. All 
stakeholders must recognize that, when dealing with health care policy and regulations, 
lives are truly at stake. A poorly informed or improperly vetted regulatory change can 
indeed put the safety of patients and the quality of health services provided at risk. This 
is perhaps the most critical reason why health care policies must follow research and 
evidence. Health care providers are trained from the earliest days of their career to 







CHAPTER 3 – We Were not Prepared: The Lessons of 
COVID 19  
INTRODUCTION 
“Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis 
occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, 
I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to 
keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the 
politically inevitable.”  - Milton Friedman  
Chapter 3 is dedicated to elucidating the pre-pandemic health care policy and regulatory 
environment—specifically as it relates to telehealth. While this thesis proposes the need 
for an alternative approach to health care technology policymaking from the broadest 
perspective, it was in the midst of this pandemic that telehealth emerged as the most 
urgent and timely innovation. It provides the perfect case for why the policy follows 
approach laid out in Chapters 1 and 2 offers the surest and most sensible guide for 
rebuilding our broken health care system in a well-informed and inclusive manner. This 
pandemic has provided the political will to re-set our collective perspective on what an 
efficient and equitable health care system should provide. And while the political agenda 
may not have shifted with it, the policy follows approach provides, finally, a way of 
tuning out the political noise. It provides a chance for bi-partisan recognition of a path 






The COVID-19 pandemic has put immense strain on the U.S. health care system and 
disrupted many of the traditional channels of delivering health care. Due to the risks of 
COVID-19 exposure to patients, families, providers, and health care facility staff from 
delivery of in-person care, practitioners across the country, and the world, has shifted 
services rapidly toward telehealth and other virtual and remote care services. According 
to a McKinsey and Company report, 63more than 70% of in-person health care visits 
were cancelled at the outset of the pandemic. In their place, telehealth visits were 
scaled rapidly and dramatically, with health care providers of all types reporting that 
telehealth visits increased 50 to 175-fold. Whereas in 2019 only 11% of consumers had 
used telehealth, during the pandemic 76% of those surveyed indicated that they were 
highly or moderately likely to use telehealth services in the future.   
What makes this incredible surge in telehealth usage during the pandemic even more 
remarkable is that in the five to ten years prior to the pandemic, much of the debate 
about telehealth policy and payment was focused on the lack of expected progress with 
adoption and integration of services. Despite the relatively straightforward technological 
approach and the obvious theoretical benefits, adoption of telehealth services across 
the health care system had, for years, been stuck somewhere between 10-15% for both 
patients and providers64. But almost, overnight, health care institutions across the 
country scaled telehealth across entire enterprises.   
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It is rare that the political, social, technological, and environmental factors driving the 
adoption of a health care technology change so rapidly and dramatically. Such a 
spectacular shift creates a unique opportunity to evaluate the many factors that created 
a relatively stagnant environment around telehealth—pre-pandemic—but also has 
created such a seismic shift during it, and which will shape the response of the health 
care system in its aftermath. Thus, this chapter will focus on telehealth during and after 
the pandemic as an ideal laboratory for the evaluation and application of the policy 
leads versus policy follows approach to health care technology policy. 
THE PRE-PANDEMIC POLICY PREDICAMENT 
Prior to the pandemic, the expansion of telehealth was subject to the complexities of the 
U.S. health care system as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. A largely fee-for-service 
payment system put various stakeholders at odds regarding the best path forward. 
Employing the technology to reduce hospital or Intensive Care Unit (ICU) admissions, 
as many programs had been shown to do65, certainly benefitted the patient and the 
payer, but might have decreased revenue for hospitals66. Programs that provided 
convenient access to urgent care services for minor conditions such as sinusitis or a 
sore throat, were convenient for patients but increased overutilization and increased 
expense for payers and put community health care providers at risk by decreasing 
utilization of their practices.  
 
65Jillian Harvey, et al. “The Impact of Telemedicine on Pediatric Critical Care Triage.” Pediatric Critical Care Medicine. 
November 18, 2017. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28922271/ 
66Byung-Kwang Yoo, et al. “Economic Evaluation of Telemedicine for Patients in ICUs.” Critical Care Medicine. 







Low utilization of telehealth services became a chicken or egg scenario, as the 
investment of time and resources required to integrate telehealth workflows into 
electronic health records (EHRs), scheduling, and billing practices led to telehealth 
services using stand-alone mini-EHRs and often billing patients out-of-pocket rather 
than billing insurance. This complicated the collection of consistent data about the 
services provided, since much of that data is collected via EHRs and payer claims data. 
Without the necessary evidence from well-collected, consistent data supporting the 
benefit of the services, providers were slow to adopt telehealth, and payers and 
policymakers were reluctant to reimburse for the services.  
The lack of consistent reimbursement for services and poor integration with EHRs led to 
a focus on relatively simple-to-implement services. This concentrated telehealth 
development on minor, acute patient complaints for which patients often sought 
convenient care and would be willing to pay a small amount out of pocket. The effective 
management of chronic and complex conditions requires coordinated care teams, often 
with multiple specialties, easy access to patients’ historical medical records, and well-
established follow-up mechanisms. Therefore, telehealth services supporting more 
coordinated care approaches were largely confined to academic institutions which had 
grant funding allowing them to pursue development of such programs. 
Because non-grant-funded telehealth providers were racing to develop and roll-out new 
services, resources were very often devoted to those development efforts, but generally 
not devoted to data collection, quality improvement, and research activities67. And thus, 
 







the problem continued to compound itself, as the lack of reliable data inhibited adoption 
across the care system, and the lack of adoption in turn prevented the collection and 
evaluation of adequate data to produce meaningful results. 
Additionally, because the target demographic for urgent care type programs aiming to 
treat minor, acute conditions was patients who could afford to pay out of pocket and had 
easy access to technology, populations without those resources—the poor, rural, or 
otherwise underserved—were often overlooked. This included non-English-speaking 
populations, for whom telehealth platforms generally did not have integrated interpreter 
services or multi-lingual interfaces. 
Finally, the state-to-state variation in payment for telehealth services, licensure 
requirements, malpractice coverage, privacy regulations, and more led to a mire of 
regulatory and policy variations that made practicing telehealth across state lines a 
significant undertaking. Clear policy and regulatory guidance for a given state was often 
difficult to come by, and an understanding of the policy and regulatory environment in 
multiple states was a true rarity. These complications, combined with the technological 
investment and expertise required for startup and maintenance of most telehealth 
services prevented the majority of smaller practices from making the leap into provision 
of remote care, leaving the development of telehealth to larger institutions with the 








NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF ACCEPTANCE 
A generally accepted premise of political theory is that political forces that are already in 
motion, however slowly moving, are always accelerated during times of crisis, such as 
economic calamity, war, and plague. Without the Great Depression, we would not have 
macro-economic policy, nor would we have realigned our political parties. Without World 
II there would be no UN, WHO, WTO, nor other acronyms of global collaboration. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has battered the U.S. with two of these three crises in a very short 
span of time. The factors influencing the historical development and current state of the 
U.S. health care system, which were detailed in Chapter 1—the lack of a single payer 
system, largely fee-for-service payment models, and the rise of employer-based health 
insurance—all contributed significantly to the extraordinary pressures placed on health 
care providers across the country at the onset of the pandemic.  
Hospitals, health systems, and individual practices all saw patient volumes and revenue 
fall precipitously. Even emergency rooms outside of “hot zones,” which all braced for a 
surge of COVID-19 patients, saw overall volumes drop dramatically, as patients have 
avoided ERs and clinics for fear of infection68. Elective surgeries have been cancelled or 
delayed, as have scheduled ambulatory visits. Health systems across the country have 
placed many staff on temporary or permanent furlough to cut costs. In a value-based 
health care system, such reductions in volume would not create significant financial 
strain. However, in a fee-for-service model they threatened the financial viability—and in 
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some cases, even the actual existence—of many institutions.69 70 Third-party health 
insurance plans, on the other hand, have made a fortune.71 While some discounted 
premiums for beneficiaries, the majority adopted the position that financial windfalls 
early in the pandemic resulting from decreased utilization would be completely offset in 
future months by a surge of either COVID-19 related utilization, or heavy utilization due 
to “catch up” visits and care for chronic conditions that have worsened during the 
pandemic due to inadequate attention. Federal and state governments have stepped in 
with stimulus funding to support at-risk health care facilities, which added to the costs 
associated with the already monumental economic crisis.72 Countries with a national 
health care system, by contrast, have avoided such strains and imbalance, since 
decreased utilization of services also decreased their own costs.73 Finally, given the 
United States’ employer-based insurance system, as unemployment soared the number 
of uninsured across the country has risen precipitously as well, creating further, short 
and long-term, challenges for access to care.74 
Adding to these financial burdens, health care providers find themselves facing new and 
unforeseen challenges to the delivery of care. While health care system capacity in 
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some areas, particularly ICU capacity, has been overwhelmed, other facilities outside of 
hot zones sit with entire floors empty. Even those facilities, however, have faced critical 
shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE). Many practitioners and support staff 
themselves are often at high risk of COVID-19 related morbidity and mortality due to 
age or pre-existing conditions such as hypertension, diabetes, or immune suppression 
from any cause. Even those who are young and healthy risk transmission of the virus to 
sick or at-risk loved ones or friends outside work. In-person school was cancelled 
across the country, putting additional strain on health care workers with school-aged 
children. Families and friends have been restricted from visiting loved ones in the 
hospital. COVID-19 testing resources have been limited and in high demand, but the 
infrastructure to provide testing in a safe and effective manner was initially non-
existent.75 
A Nearly Ideal Solution: Ten Years of Change in Three Weeks 
Within this unprecedented environment, telehealth and virtual care approaches have 
been ideally suited to address many of the challenges arising from the pandemic. 
Remotely caring for patients has allowed for physical distancing and accordingly 
protects patients, families, providers, and staff. Telehealth capabilities have allowed 
conservation of precious PPE and closer monitoring of patients outside of an ICU 
setting. Remote patient monitoring approaches also have allowed low-risk patients to be 
managed at home. Direct-to-consumer telehealth platforms previously intended to care 
 
75 Preeti Mehrotra, Preeti Malani, Prashant Yadav. “Personal Protective Equipment Shortages During COVID-19—








for minor, acute conditions have been quickly repurposed as virtual triage platforms. 
This has allowed patients who have been concerned that they might require a COVID-
19 test to complete online assessments screens and then be cleared for access to 
rapidly erected drive-through testing facilities. Families restricted from visiting ill loved 
ones can visit via videoconference. Perhaps most critical to the viability of the health 
care system, virtual care has allowed providers to continue to care for their patients and 
maintain a stream of revenue, and continuity with their patients, even when in-person 
visits have been nearly non-existent. Ambulatory services have shifted toward virtual 
care in a matter of days. Telehealth seemed like the solution to nearly every problem 
the pandemic has posed. 
But we were not prepared. The pre-pandemic telehealth environment, as outlined 
above, was largely geared toward management of minor, acute conditions with out-of-
pocket payment models that often didn’t require standard billing and documentation. 
Therefore, integration of telehealth services into standardized workflows of the 
electronic health record (EHR)—for scheduling, intake, documentation, billing, etc.—
was limited. Additional programs that provided virtual emergency room care, such as 
telestroke services, were not heavily utilized because patients were not presenting to 
emergency rooms. Services had been targeted toward “consumers” with easy access to 
technology and the means to pay out of pocket, so adequate technology and processes 
needed to ensure access for underserved, rural, and disadvantaged populations were 
not in place. Furthermore, the patients at highest risk for COVID-19 morbidity and 
mortality—racial minorities, non-English-speaking populations, the chronically-ill—often 






them in mind. Further complicating the rapid roll-out of telehealth services was the fact 
that due to the low pre-pandemic adoption of telehealth practice across the health care 
system, the vast majority of providers who were suddenly tasked with treating patients 
remotely had minimal to no training or experience with provision of virtual care. 
Subsequently, the vicious cycle summarized above—low adoption by clinicians, leading 
to insufficient evidence to support telehealth utilization, in turn leading to inadequate 
payment for telehealth—all of which contributed to low clinician adoption, was once 
again salient. 
Further adding to the burdens, strains, and anxieties described above was the urgent 
requirement for health care Information Technology (IT) teams to abruptly design new 
technical systems, redesign workflows, implement new technical support processes, 
revamp billing and documentation procedures, and deploy or repurpose enormous 
amounts of equipment—across vast health systems—in only a matter of days. 
From a government perspective, this new landscape and myriad challenges meant that 
the existing state-to-state variation in telehealth policy and regulation presented 
insurmountable barriers on a critically short time frame. HIPAA provisions which 
restricted the platforms that could be used for virtual services, and federal payment 
policies that restricted provision of care via telehealth into patients’ homes, outside of 
rural areas, or by limited types of providers, would have made the solutions afforded by 
telehealth untenable. State and federal policymakers responded out of necessity, 
dropping restrictions and opening up payment for telehealth.76 Accordingly, the 
 






explosion of telehealth across the country during the pandemic has not been triggered 
by policy changes, but rather, the explosion of telehealth has been the trigger for policy 
and regulatory change.  Policies have followed the clearly identified needs of the health 
care system.  
The Government Response: COVID-19 Legislative and Regulatory Changes  
The federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been extensive and has 
highlighted some of the difficulties posed by a federated system to an adequate public 
health emergency response. On January 31, 2020, Alex Azar, the U.S. Secretary for 
Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a public emergency under the Public Health 
Service Act (PHSA)77. This issuance was intended to release funding and facilitation for 
precipitous development of rapid diagnostic tests, assessing the effectiveness of 
established drugs or the development of new antiviral treatments and vaccines. On 
March 13, 2020, President Trump used the National Emergencies Act to declare a 
National Emergency, which allowed for waiver of current federal rules to enable broad 
and rapid use of existing telehealth technologies and increase hospital capacities. 
Additionally, Trump declared an emergency under the Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, proclaiming “the preeminent responsibility of the Federal 
Government to take action to stem a nationwide pandemic.”78 This allowed for a number 
of powers—not all of which are relevant to this thesis—to be exercised. However, it is 
important to note that the complicated interplay between the powers these national 
emergency statutes permit our federal and state governments and what latitudes they 
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allow our national health agencies to deploy under certain conditions, is antiquated. 
They had not, at the time of these declarations, been truly tested.79 This pandemic has 
exposed numerous vulnerabilities in our ability to leverage the cutting edge health care 
technologies the U.S. has developed while balancing them with the infringement of 
certain constitutionally guaranteed individual freedoms, the difficulties of uniform 
enforcement of national health agency guidelines, and the challenges of the prevailing 
political zeitgeist.  
Telehealth Specific Emergency Waivers 
Waivers impacting the provision of telehealth—and closely interrelated health 
technology practices—implemented as a result of emergency declarations, legislation, 
and regulatory changes, fell into four main categories: alterations to Medicare, 
alterations to state Medicaid and private payer guidelines, licensure requirements, and 
regulatory enforcement of HIPAA.  
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Securities (CARES) Act was passed and 
signed into law on March 27th, 2020.80 CARES included $45 million for the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to expand information technology, build 
communication capacities, and increase the capacity in response to these coordinated 
efforts. Nine million was allotted to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
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(CISA) to develop or improve supply chain and information analysis and to implement 
critical infrastructure coordination. Of the $140.4 billion provided to HHS, $275 million 
was specifically earmarked for expansion of care to rural hospitals, poison control 
centers, and the Ryan White HIV/AIDS program, utilizing telehealth, through the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Five hundred million was designated 
for investment in public health data surveillance and infrastructure modernization (a 
program which had been initiated just prior to COVID), to assist states with developing 
COVID-19 tracking and reporting tools. In addition, funding was provided to the 
Veteran’s Administration to expand capacity of its IT networks, to broaden telehealth 
capabilities and address the increased demand for virtual services. Finally, the 
Secretary of HHS was directed to consider ways to encourage the use of 
telecommunications systems, including for remote patient monitoring and other 
communications or monitoring services, clarifying guidance, and conducting outreach to 
state governments.81 
As mentioned in an earlier section of this chapter, state-to-state variations in licensing 
requirements had created barriers to addressing shortages in the number of available 
health care providers. The CARES Act allowed states to waive in-state licensing 
requirements for providers delivering telehealth, per specific terms and conditions. But 
these “specific terms and conditions” were left to the states to determine. Florida 
became an early, notable example as it approved out-of-state providers to deliver 
services through telehealth to Floridians without attaining a license for the duration of 
 







the public health emergency. By March 26, 2020, twenty-six states had waived 
licensure. As of October 16, forty-two states and three U.S. territories had modified 
requirements for licensing.82 
One of the more complicated changes enacted by CARES is the latitude given to states 
to expand telehealth coverage via Medicaid. In general, the Act provided that states 
could amend existing Medicaid rules to include one or more of the following:  
• loosening the limitations on payment based on the location of the patient 
• requiring that provider reimbursement for via telehealth be the same as that of a 
traditional in-person visit 
• expanding coverage of certain service via telehealth (examples include mental 
health, dentistry, physical therapy, occupational therapy, outpatient respiratory 
therapy, etc.) 
• allowing for multiple methods of telehealth (such as telephone visits without the 
requirement of video) 
• removing the requirement of an initial face-to-face appointment to establish a 
provider relationship 
As of June 2020, all fifty states had undertaken some type of action to expand Medicaid 
coverage to assist in caring for COVID-19 patients.83  
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While the CARES Act loosened restrictions on federally funded programs’ provision of 
telehealth, they could not mandate changes to commercial or private health care 
insurance providers. This allowed private insurance payers to negotiate with individual 
states regarding what expansions should be made for telehealth coverage. As of 
passage of the CARES Act, seventeen states had mandated that commercial insurance 
carriers cover telehealth throughout the duration of the declared public emergency. 
However, what exactly “coverage” meant was a matter of concession between the state 
and the payer. Negotiated expansions included a wide variety of modifications including, 
but not limited to, waiving all co-pays, coinsurance, and deductibles for patients whose 
care related to COVID-19 diagnostic testing and requiring provider reimbursement for 
telehealth be the same as reimbursement for an in-person visit. Private insurers are 
now beginning to re-evaluate payment approaches for telehealth as the volume of in-
person visits begins to normalize.  
Much like the morass of state and federal laws concerning the provision and coverage 
of telehealth, the confusing mix of state and federal laws regarding HIPAA privacy 
regulations also presented challenges to providing effective care and rapid 
communication of disease status to community and federal health agencies. In 
response, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), which is charged with enforcement of HIPAA 
regulations, announced that it would not impose penalties for non-compliance with the 
regulatory requirements under the HIPAA Rules against covered health care providers 
in connection with the good faith provision of telehealth for the duration of the 








compliant communications platforms, such as FaceTime and Zoom, to be used for 
telehealth visits.84 This flexibility was critical to the timely ability of many practices, 
particularly smaller practices, to communicate via video with their patients if they had 
not previously invested in implementing a HIPAA-compliant solution. 
A CLEAR PATH FORWARD – IF WE CAN ALL AGREE TO SEE IT 
The pandemic will require that we rebuild our health care system. We cannot return to 
provision of care as before because the twin crises of economic calamity and plague 
have exposed the weaknesses of our fee-for-service, employer-based system. But, of 
more consequence, it has created a new reality in which these, and other, 
fundamentally flawed systems can no longer continue to function effectively. We find 
ourselves in a completely altered landscape from where things stood less than a year 
ago. The solutions needed to integrate health care technology, such as telehealth, into 
the care system are now tightly intertwined with the required evolution of the health care 
system itself. There is a pressing need to accelerate the shift to value-based payment 
models, create a more stable financial environment for health care providers, address 
the obvious racial and ethnic disparities in the system, and develop a more robust and 
adaptable public health program.85  
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The shift to value-based care and creation of a more resilient financial structure for 
health care providers go hand-in-hand. Even before the pandemic, poorly compensated 
services like primary care and mental health, and safety net hospitals in poor and 
underserved areas were struggling to survive, while more expensive services were 
encouraged under the current fee-for-service system. And health systems often relied 
on those more expensive, high volume services to offset the cost of providing the lower 
paid services. This pandemic cleaved those symbiotic relationships, causing already 
vulnerable services to falter even more and overtaxing some systems’ ability to keep 
pace with the demand for acute, specialized care. The pandemic starkly exposed the 
susceptibility of our current payment system to any major fluctuation in the market. If 
well paid services are no longer in demand, the system collapses and health workers, 
ironically already in too short a supply to provide for all of our citizen’s health care 
needs, lose their jobs.  
The integration of virtual care options into a hybrid model of care could provide health 
care practitioners and systems with the adaptability and resiliency so desperately 
needed in the face of turbulent times. The health system’s response to the pandemic 
was to support the care givers who normally provide in-person services by adding the 
provision of virtual care, and as in-person visits have regained momentum, those 
providers have likewise transitioned away from telehealth. However, it should be 
realized that maintaining the flexibility of clinicians to provide services via either in-
person or virtual care, depending on the circumstances and needs of the patient, will be 
important for several reasons. The evidence and experience from the pandemic shows 






flexibility necessary for health care providers to maintain continuity of care and revenue, 
regardless of the environment, 2) it encourages the integration of virtual care services 
into EHRs, improving data collection, documentation, and billing practices, 3) it supports 
primary care practices’ participation in the provision of virtual care, and 4) it facilitates 
the management of chronic and complex disease through virtual care, versus only 
simple management of minor, acute conditions. 
Key questions remain, however, that will need to be addressed through research and 
evidence. As the costs to payers of providing in-person services move back toward the 
more expensive pre-pandemic levels, they are wary of the potential for fraud, abuse, 
and overutilization of telehealth without a true understanding of the value it brings. And, 
the clinical impacts of virtual care at the population health level, particularly for chronic 
and complex disease, remains unclear. 
Here is where the policy follows approach dictates that we focus resources and efforts 
in support of research. It is reasonable to expect that the development of a hybrid, 
flexible model of integrated, virtual, and in-person care options, provided by established 
physicians and specialists, would reduce the risk of fraud, abuse, and overutilization 
through better coordination and care planning. It is also reasonable to hypothesize that 
provision of virtual care into the homes of patients with medically complex and chronic 
conditions would result in better outcomes and lower costs. Fortunately, the incredible 
expansion of telehealth during the pandemic has generated a substantial trove of data 






using this data to generate robust evidence to support, or refute, these ideas would 
provide a much clearer path forward for telehealth policy and regulation. 
It must also be addressed that the statistics on the disproportionate effects of COVID-19 
on Black and Hispanic persons is startling. According to a recent New England Journal 
of Medicine article, nearly 20% of the counties in the U.S. are disproportionately black, 
and these communities have accounted for more than half of the COVID cases and 
almost 60% of the COVID deaths, nationally.86 The trend is not much improved for 
Hispanics. There are many deep, systemic causes for these findings but fundamentally, 
people of color and lower socio-economic status, have less access to coverage and 
care, leaving them more vulnerable to chronic illness. This population also tends to 
have food and housing insecurities which are often associated with lack of access to 
reliable transportation or internet. Research during the pandemic has already 
demonstrated that the surge in virtual care utilization may have exacerbated, rather than 
improved, disparities in access to health care. Investigators at the University of 
California – San Francisco demonstrated that, following the rapid scaling up of 
telemedicine visits at their two large primary care practices, a significantly smaller 
proportion of visits were with vulnerable patient populations (age 65+, non-English 
language preference, Medicare, and Medicaid patients) and minorities.87  The authors 
proposed four key actions for clinicians and health system leaders “to ensure that the 
current telemedicine implementation does not exacerbate health disparities:… (1) 
 
86David Blumenthal. “Covid-19—"Implications for the Health Care System.” New England Journal of Medicine. 
October 8, 2020. https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmsb2021088 
87Sarah Nouri, et. al. “Addressing Equity in Telemedicine for Chronic Disease Management During the Covid-19 






proactively explore potential disparities in telemedicine access, (2) develop solutions to 
mitigate barriers to digital literacy and the resources needed for engagement in video 
visits, (3) remove health-system created barriers to accessing video visits, and (4) 
advocate for policies and infrastructure that facilitate equitable telemedicine access.” 
These steps align perfectly with a policy follows approach to developing telehealth 
legislation addressing disparities in access. The authors add, “Without taking these 
actions now, health care systems risk creating telemedicine programs that exclude 
vulnerable populations… We strongly recommend all clinicians advocate for changes at 
local, state, and federal policy levels.” 
“The ideas lying around”:  Federal Preemption 
This brings us to perhaps the most critical, and likely most contentious, 
recommendation of the thesis: health technology policies established at the federal level 
should be preemptive of state legislation. As has been illustrated throughout these 
chapters, the state-by-state variation in policy, regulation, payment, and practice of 
telehealth has created monumental barriers to the effective development and adoption 
of telehealth services. The elimination of much of this variability has been vitally 
important to the use of telehealth to effectively respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. It is 
very likely that the most imminent threat is the resurgence of that state-by-state 
variability in policy, regulation, payment, and practice when the state of emergency ends 







This state variation does not pose the same burden to the in-person practice of 
medicine because, by definition, the patient and provider are in the same location. In 
contrast, for a technology in which, by definition, the patient and provider are in different 
locations, such variation can be a monumental barrier to progress in many areas, 
including administration, billing, compliance, research, policy development, and the 
sharing of best practices.  
Federal laws and regulations are already functionally, if not technically, preemptive in 
many spheres of health IT. Federal Medicare regulations pertaining to EHRs, for 
example, are functionally preemptive because the vast majority of EHRs cover 
Medicare patients, and the vast majority of providers care for Medicare patients, as at 
least some percentage of the population that they serve. Therefore, the design and 
operation of EHR functionality must conform to federal regulations to avoid the crippling 
complexity that would come from applying different regulations to different populations 
managed through the same system. Similarly, much of the health care technology 
developed for use in the U.S. adheres to federal regulations, since the target market is 
uniformly broader than a single state. 
Because telehealth is more about how medicine is practiced for a population of patients 
than about the particular technology, however, federal regulations pertaining to a 
specific population, such as Medicare patients, can reasonably be applied only to that 
population, leaving other populations subject to rampant state variation. Federal 
preemption would provide stability, clarity, and cohesion for the practice of telehealth 






pandemic, research is underway that could inform such federal policy using a policy 
follows approach, thus addressing the potential uncertainty and subjectivity around the 
development of federally-preemptive policy. One of the great benefits of quality science 
is that its findings don’t change when you cross state lines, and therefore federal policy 
guided by science can reasonably be applied broadly as well. Federal preemption would 
greatly simplify the practice of telehealth, the adoption of best practices, and very 
importantly—particularly if guided by a policy follows approach—the design and conduct 
of impactful multicenter clinical, translational, health services, and economic research 
that would guide such policies. 
The questions for researchers, which are highlighted by the pandemic and which should 
directly inform upcoming policy changes include: 
• What is the true impact of the broad adoption of telehealth services on access to 
care for vulnerable populations? 
• How does an integrated model of telehealth and in-person care impact the costs to 
health care providers, payers, and the system as a whole, in both a fee-for-service 
and value-based care model? 
• What factors are most critical to the successful integration of telehealth and virtual 
care services through EHRs to facilitate efficiency of practice, at scale? 
• How can telehealth services most effectively integrate multi-lingual support into 







• How do technology barriers faced by rural, underserved, minority, and 
underprivileged populations impact their ability to access telehealth and virtual care 
services? 
By focusing on these questions, and utilizing the data generated during the pandemic, 
research can not only improve the care provided within our health system, it can drive 
the development of meaningful and impactful health care technology policies that will 
positively shape our health care system for decades to come. 
 
CONCLUSION: WHEN “THE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE BECOMES 
THE POLITICALLY INEVITABLE” 
We come back to where we started. Health technology must drive the evolution of the 
health care system now, just as it did with the rise of hospital care in the early 1900s 
and throughout our history. Thus, the guiding principles for health care technology 
policy must work synergistically with those for the health care system as a whole. 
Moving forward, policy development for health technology, should follow three core 
principles:  1) we should utilize policy follows, research, and expertise, 2) federal 
policies should, as a general rule, be preemptive of state policies for health technology, 
particularly telehealth, and 3) we must aggressively pursue value-based care models 
and move away from fee-for-service payment. These three core principles are each 







This presents an opportunity which has never before existed. The pandemic has made 
the politically impossible, the politically inevitable. The question now is how we make 
the inevitable a reality. The paradigm shift associated with the pandemic provides an 
extraordinary opening to alter the emphasis of the industry—and the research 
associated with it—to concentrate on areas that can provide the greatest impact to the 
health care system and the widest variety of patients. And perhaps most profoundly, it 
provides the ability to re-set the political agenda, which will finally allow for transition to 
a value-based model.   
The proficiency most needed now is not industry or technical expertise. It is clinical and 
research expertise. We must follow the scientific process and base changes on clinical 
and translational research findings. The cautionary tale of Theranos should remind us 
that relying on the wrong expertise, and on an inappropriate political agenda, will lead 
us astray. In that case, policymakers banked on the expertise of industry leaders, and 
powerful political voices and their agendas, without the scientific evidence to back it up.  
We cannot continue to make such mistakes.  A policy follows approach dictates that we 
follow where the science leads. It also dictates that the researchers themselves are 
likewise guided. We must direct research questions toward the policy issues that are 
most in need of answers; we must also consider where research to answer those 
questions is still lacking. The coordination between researchers and policymakers must 
become more intentional and bidirectional. It is through such bidirectional 






the efficient, effective, inclusive, and innovative health care system our nation so 








For a considerable period of U.S. history we have been wrestling with scientific 
innovations in health care, developing the best practices for providing the highest quality 
care possible, and subjecting those best practices to our complicated system of shifting 
political agendas, differing political and economic theories, and our government’s 
complicated and unique system of checks and balances. The current state of our 
national health care system indicates the poor results of these intersecting—and often 
competing—efforts.  
The United States has the world’s most expensive health care system, and pre-
pandemic, the percentage of our GDP it represented was consistently growing by 
astounding margins. How to fix such a broken system has become one of the major 
political pain points of our nation’s ability to maintain a healthy citizenry. Bearing the 
onus of attempting to address the improvement of such a colossally complicated system 
and emotionally charged debate has become such perilous territory for politicians that 
few choose to do more than pay lip service to the need for change. In truth, the 
patchworked system we have created has become so ensnared in special interests, 
entrenched systems of care provision, and identity politics, that even those 
administrations who have possessed the ethos, courage, and intellectual capabilities to 
actually produce meaningful change, have seen their efforts and accomplishments 
dashed by those who cannot grasp the magnitude of the importance of fundamentally 
altering our approach to provide our citizens a robust, efficient, and equitable system of 






provided a crucial opportunity to re-imagine and implement the radical changes 
required. Sound evidence is required for both. 
This thesis examines the crucible of historical, political, and economic factors which 
yielded the pre-pandemic system. Further, it examines specific cases to shine a critical 
light on the ways in which the system has failed. Most importantly, this thesis provides a 
new theory for approaching the task of transitioning toward a Value Based Care model 
and creating effective and forward-thinking health innovation policy in light of what we 
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